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I 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DANIEL R. MELLEN, ) 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. Case No. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, )i 10795 
UTAH RICHARDSON ROOFING, and 
THE ST A TE INSURANCE FUND, 
Def end ants and Respondents. 
APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING AND 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
COMES NOW Daniel R. Mellen, plaintiff herein, and 
respectfully petitions this Honorable Court for a rehearing 
in the above-entitled case. 
This petition is based on the following grounds: 
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POINT I 
THE COURT HAS FAILED TO CONSIDER THE 
POWERS CASE, WHICH WAS CITED AND ARGUED 
IN THE ORAL ARGUMENT. 
POINT II 
THE DECISION IN THIS CASE DISCOURAGES 
SCRUTINY BY THIS COURT OF REPORTS OF MED-
ICAL PANELS. 
POINT III 
THE COMMISSION ARBITRARILY DISREQARDED 
AND IGNORED THE EVIDENCE AND ADOPTED THE 
REPORT OF A MEDICAL PANEL WHICH DID NOT 
BELIEVE ANY OVEREXERTION CASE SHOULD BE 
COMPENSABLE. 
RAWLINGS, WALLACE, ROBERTS & BLACK 
JOHN L. BLACK 
Attorneys for Plaintiff & Appellant 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REHEARING 
POINT I 
THE COURT HAS FAILED TO CONSIDER THE 
POWERS CASE, WHICH WAS CITED AND ARGUED 
IN THE ORAL ARGUMENT. 
There is no mention made by the court of the recent case 
of James H. Powers, Plaintiff, vs. Industrial Commission of 
Utah, and Salt Lake City Corporation, Defendants, No. 
10587, filed May 10, 1967. The opinion in the Powers case 
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was published after the brief had been filed in the Mellen 
case. However, at the oral argument the Powers case was 
cited by counsel for plaintiff and argued as the case most 
persuasive in favor of reversing the denial of an award. Yet, 
the court in its opinion has seen fit to ignore the Powers case. 
On page two the court states that plaintiff relies heavily and 
only on three cases, to wit: The Baker case, the Jones case, 
and the Purity Biscuit case. It is true that these cases were 
relied on by plaintiff in his brief. However, at the argument 
of this case, as shown by the recording, counsel stressed and 
emphasized the Powers case as the case most controlling for the 
decision in the case at bar. It was stated at page three of the 
Powers decision: 
"The law is well settled that the aggravation or 
lighting up of a pre-existing disease by an industrial 
accident is compensable and that an internal failure 
brought about by exertion in the course of employment 
may be an accident within the meaning of the act." 
It was further stated: 
"\'iV e are of the opinion that in these cases we are 
only concerned with the proposition as to whether or 
not an ordinary exertion as contrasted to an unusual 
exertion caused the injury in question." 
In spite of the striking similarity between the Powers 
case and the case at bar, the court has seen fit to ignore the 
law as laid down by the Powers decision and has taken pains 
to distinguish the three cases cited in our brief. Plaintiff did 
not c1te these three cases as cases with identical fact situations 
and agrees that the fact situations in said cases may be distin-
guished from the fact situation in the case at bar. However, 
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plaintiff felt that two of these cases were good examples of 
cases where this court has reversed the Industrial Commission 
for failing to find in accordance with the evidence. This is 
exactly what the Industrial Commission did in the case at 
bar. The Purity Biscuit Company case was cited as authority 
for the rule that the unusual exertion rule does not apply in 
the State of Utah. The Jones case was a good example of a 
case where the evidence on the side of the denial was incon-
clusive; whereas, the evidence on the side of the plaintiff was 
positive and direct, the court reversing the denial by the 
Industrial Commission for not following the evidence. Like-
wise, the Baker case was a case where this court reversed for 
the reason that the Commission did not follow the evidence. 
In distinguishing these cases, the court has seen fit to state 
that the Baker case is inapropos and to cite at length from a 
special concurrence by Chief Justice Wolf in the Purity Biscuit 
Company case in which he proposes a rule which would re-
quire a plaintiff to prove causation by clear and convincing 
evidence. This rule has never been adopted. The court goes 
on to cite the case of Carling v. Industrial Commission, 16 
Utah 2d 260, 399 P.2d 202, as a case in point. The Carling 
case is clearly distinguishable from the case at bar. In the 
Carling case there was evidence of a hearing loss as early as 
1945 where plaintiff was claiming a single incident as damag-
ing his hearing in 19~ There was clear evidence in that 
case supporting the denial of award by the Industrial Com-
mission. However, no such evidence exists in the case at bar. 
In the case at bar there is no evidence that plaintiff had 
complaints of heart trouble prior to the incidents in question. 
The evidence is undisputed that prior to the week in question, 
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plaintiff was a productive member of society and that follow-
ing the week in question he was not. The Powers case is clear 
authority for the proposition that exertion precipitating a 
heart condition is compensable. 
The court also cites the case of Burton v. Industrial Com-
mission, 13 Utah 2d 353, 374 P.2d 439, as controlling. In the 
Burton case the family physician, who was not a heart expert, 
merely testified that the occurrence in question could be a 
factor. In opposition to this testimony, there was direct testi-
mony that the coronary thrombosis with myocardial infarction 
was not caused by the exertion of the work. There was no 
such direct compelling evidence in the case at bar. This court 
stated that plaintiff's personal physician thought, with some 
qualification, that the onset was due to the extra exertion on 
the roof. Plaintiff refers the court to the record which shows 
no qualification in the testimony of Dr. Behrens. He stated: 
"I do feel that the exertion which he carried on dur-
ing that day hastened the onset of the ultimate situ-
ation." 
As opposed to this, Dr. Kilpatrick admitted that the ex-
ertion could have precipitated the myocardial infarction. 
Thus, we see in the case at bar evidence of "it could have 
been" as opposed to a positive "was." It is submitted that 
this situation is comparable to the state of the evidence in the 
Jones case. 
POINT II 
THE DECISION IN THIS CASE DISCOURAGES 
SCRUTINY BY THIS COURT OF REPORTS OF MED-
ICAL PANELS. 
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On the fourth page of the opinion, the court rejects plain-
tiff's contention that the medical panel report was based on 
incorrect interpretation of the law and contrary to the undis-
puted evidence. The court indicates in its opinion that it is 
improper for counsel to criticize and take issue with medical 
panels in cases such as this. Certainly, it is the function of 
this court to review the findings by the Industrial Commis-
sion; and when the Industrial Commission adopts the findings 
of medical panels, it appears that the function of this court 
would be to scrutinize said reports to see if they are based on 
incorrect interpretations of law and incorrect findings from 
the evidence. The panel report states in part as follows: 
"The panel members have agreed that the situation 
of overwork, anxiety related to financial reverses, etc., 
should not be a factor in considering an industrial ac-
cident. * * * The actual work he was doing was no 
different than he had been accustomed to for a number 
of years. Hence the situation as it was, with his pain 
in the chest occurring long before the day of the 
alleged injury, would tend to indicate that he had a 
natural evolution of the degenerative process in his 
heart, which culminated in an attack of pain * * *." 
(Italics ours) 
The basis for the decision by the Industrial Commission 
is the medical panel report. It is obvious that a legitimate 
inquiry would be as to the basis of the report, both as to law 
and facts. If the medical panel is laboring under a misappre-
hension of the law and refuses to apply the correct law, then 
certainly its report would be subject to attack. Likewise, if 
the panel is laboring under a misapprehension of the evidence, 
then this would be a legitimate area for attack. It is submitted 
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that the panel in this case believed that overwork is not a 
factor in an industrial accident, contrary to the law in this 
State. In addition, this panel believed that a plaintiff must 
show an unusual strain as contrasted with a usual strain in 
order to recover. In addition, the panel has stated that plain-
tiff had pain in his chest long before the day of the alleged 
incident, which is a misstatement of the evidence in this case. 
Certainly these things are legitimate areas of attack in this 
case. When the Industrial Commission adopts and follows 
the report, it is committing the same errors as the medical 
panel. 
The panel report in the Powers case contained the same 
misapprehension of the law as to an unusual strain being 
required, and the report was properly rejected by this court. 
In the recent case of Garner, et al., v. Hecla Mining Co., et al., 
No. 10667, filed August 24, 1967, the dissenting opinion 
points out that the panel in that case thought that plaintiff 
had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the 
issue of causation. It is obvious that a legitimate area of ap-
pellate review is whether there is a proper basis for the find-
ing of a medical panel. The decision of this case discourages 
scrutiny of medical panel reports and therefore is tantamount 
to an abandonment by this court of its proper appellate func-
tion. 
Incidentally, the opinion in the case at bar cites the case 
of Garner v. Hecla Mining Co. as authority for its holding. 
This case cannot be used as authority for the case at bar for 
the reason that it is an occupational disease case. Coverage in 
such a case is limited to certain named diseases or injuries to 
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health, which "directly arise as a natural incident of exposure 
occasioned by the employment," and only where it is shown 
there is a "direct and proximate causal connection between the 
conditions of the work and the occupational disease," and 
which does not result from a hazard to which the workman 
would have been equally exposed outside of the employment. 
There is no such requirement under ordinary Workmen's 
Compensation cases such as the case at bar. As was stated in 
the Powers case, an aggq .. ¥ation or lighting up of a pre-existing 
disease by an industrial accident is compensable. All that need 
be shown in this type of case is that the industrial accident 
aggravated, lighted up, or precipitated a pre-existing condi-
tion from nondisabling to disabling. This is exactly what 
happened in the case at bar. It was undisputed that Mellen 
was a working, producing individual prior to the incident in 
question, and that he was not thereafter. 
POINT III 
THE COMMISSION ARBITRARILY DISREGARDED 
AND IGNORED THE EVIDENCE AND ADOPTED THE 
REPORT OF A MEDICAL PANEL WHICH DID NOT 
BELIEVE ANY OVEREXERTION CASE SHOULD BE 
COMPENSABLE. 
It is most surprising that this court had no criticism of the 
panel report in the case at bar. It is submitted that the plain-
tiff, or any applicant could not possibly receive a fair rePort 
from a panel which has prejudged his case. The panel report 
stated that the panel members had agreed that overwork 
should not be a factor in an industrial accident. Thus, they 
have stated that in any case where overwork is alleged as a 
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precipitating cause, they would find against the applicant. 
Submitting a claim before such a panel is contrary to the most 
elemental concepts of justice in this country, where we believe 
that people should have fair hearings before impartial and 
unbiased judges. This panel, by its own words, has disquali-
fied itself from sitting in judgment on plaintiff's claim. 
The undisputed evidence is in favor of plaintiffs claim. 
It is undisputed that the pain in his chest was directly con-
nected with the exertion on the job. In addition to this, we 
have an unqualified opinion by a heart specialist that the exer-
tion precipitated and hastened his present heart disability. 
Dr. Kilpatrick admitted on cross-examination that this could 
have happened. How could Dr. Kilpatrick or the other mem-
bers of the panel rule in favor of plaintiff when they have 
already stated that they do not believe that overwork should 
be a factor in considering an industrial accident? The medical 
panel in this case has created its own law. The panel has 
stated what it believes the law should be, rather than follow-
ing the law as established by this court. This court has held 
that overexertion cases are compensable. How can this court 
fail to find fault with a panel which has so blatantly rejected 
its holdings? 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOHN L. BLACK 
Rawlings, Wallace, Roberts & Black 
530 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant 
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